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Abstract—A wide variety of privacy metrics have been pro-
posed in the literature to evaluate the level of protection offered
by privacy enhancing-technologies. Most of these metrics are
specific to concrete systems and adversarial models, and are
difficult to generalize or translate to other contexts. Further-
more, a better understanding of the relationships between the
different privacy metrics is needed to enable more grounded and
systematic approach to measuring privacy, as well as to assist
system designers in selecting the most appropriate metric for a
given application.
In this work we propose a theoretical framework for privacy-
preserving systems, endowed with a general definition of privacy
in terms of the estimation error incurred by an attacker who aims
to disclose the private information that the system is designed to
conceal. We show that our framework permits interpreting and
comparing a number of well-known metrics under a common per-
spective. The arguments behind these interpretations are based
on fundamental results related to the theories of information,
probability and Bayes decision.
Index Terms—Privacy, criteria, metrics, estimation, Bayes
decision theory, statistical disclosure control, anonymous-com-
munication systems, location-based services.
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of information and communication tech-
nologies to conduct all kinds of activities has in recent years
raised privacy concerns. There is a wide diversity of applica-
tions with a potential privacy impact, from social networking
platforms to e-commerce or mobile phone applications.
A variety of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) have
been proposed to enable the provision of new services and
functionalities while mitigating potential privacy threats. The
privacy concerns arising in different applications are diverse,
and so are the corresponding privacy-enhanced solutions that
address these concerns. Similarly, various ad hoc privacy
metrics have been proposed in the literature to evaluate the
effectiveness of PETs. The relationships between these differ-
ent metrics have however not been investigated in depth, what
leads to a fragmentation in the understanding of how privacy
properties can be measured.
In this paper we consider a general, theoretical frame-
work for privacy-preserving systems and propose using the
attacker’s estimation error as privacy metric. We show that
the most widely used privacy metrics, such as k-anonymity,
l-diversity, t-closeness, -differential privacy, as well as
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information-theoretic metrics such as Shannon’s entropy, min-
entropy, or mutual information, may be construed as particular
cases of the estimation error.
Privacy metrics, accompanied with utility metrics, provide
a quantitative means of comparing the suitability of two or
more privacy-enhancing mechanisms, in terms of the privacy-
utility trade-off posed. Ultimately, such metrics will enable
us to systematically build privacy-aware information systems
by formulating design decisions as optimization problems,
solvable theoretically or numerically, capitalizing on a rich
variety of mature ideas and powerful techniques from the wide
field of optimization engineering.
We illustrate how the general model can be instantiated
in three very different areas of application, namely statistical
disclosure control, anonymous communications and location-
based services. Statistical disclosure control (SDC) [1] is the
research area that deals with the inherent compromise between
protecting the privacy of the individuals in a microdata set
and ensuring that those data are still useful for researchers.
Traditionally, institutes and governmental statistical agencies
have systematically gathered information about individuals
with the aim of distributing those data to the research commu-
nity [2]. However, the distribution of this information should
not compromise respondents’ privacy in the sense of revealing
information about specific individuals. Motivated by this, con-
siderable research effort has been devoted to the development
of privacy-protecting mechanisms [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] to be
applied to the microdata sets before their release. In essence,
these mechanisms rely upon some form of perturbation that
permits enhancing privacy to a certain extent, at the cost of
losing some of the data utility with respect to the unperturbed
version.
With the aim of assessing the effectiveness of such mech-
anisms, numerous privacy metrics have been investigated.
Probably, the best-known privacy metric is k-anonymity, which
was first proposed in [8], [9]. In an attempt to address the
limitations of this proposal, various extensions and enhance-
ments were introduced later in [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].
While all these proposals have contributed to some extent to
the understanding of the privacy requirements of this field, the
SDC research community would undoubtedly benefit from the
existence of a rule that could help them decide which privacy
metric is the most appropriate for a particular application.
In other words, there is a need for the establishment of a
framework that enables us to compare those metrics and to
formulate them by using a common, general definition of
privacy.
In anonymous communications, one of the goals is to
conceal who talks to whom against an adversary who observes
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2the inputs and outputs of the anonymous communication
channel. Mixes [16], [17], [18] are a basic building block
for implementing anonymous communication channels. Mixes
perform cryptographic operations on messages such that it is
not possible to correlate their inputs and outputs based on their
bit patterns. In addition, mixes delay and reorder messages
to hinder the linking of inputs and outputs based on timing
information. Delaying messages has an impact on the usability
of the system, and therefore imposes a cost on the system.
On the other hand, higher delays allow for stronger levels of
privacy. There is thus a trade-off between delay (cost) and
anonymity (privacy), and optimizing the level of anonymity
for a given expected delay is interesting to extract as much
protection as possible from the anonymous channel at the
lower possible cost.
In the end, we approach the particularly rich, important ex-
ample of location-based services (LBSs), where users submit
queries along with the location to which those queries refer.
An example would be the query “Where is the nearest Italian
restaurant?”, accompanied by the geographic coordinates of
the user’s current location. In this scenario, a wide range of
approaches have been proposed, many of them based on an
intelligent perturbation of the user coordinates submitted to
the provider [19]. Essentially, users may contact an untrusted
LBS provider directly, perturbing their location information
so as to hinder providers in their efforts to compromise user
privacy in terms of location, although clearly not in terms of
query contents and activity, and at the cost of an inaccurate
answer. In a nutshell, this approach presents again the inherent
trade-off between data utility and privacy common to any
perturbative privacy method.
The survey of privacy metrics, the detailed analysis of
their connection with information theory, and the mathematical
unification as an attacker’s estimation error presented in this
paper shed new light on the understanding of those metrics and
their suitability when it comes to applying them to specific
scenarios. In regard to this aspect, two sections are devoted
to the classification of several privacy metrics, showing the
relationships with our proposal and the correspondence with
assumptions on the attacker’s strategy. While the former sec-
tion approaches this from a theoretical perspective, the latter
illustrates the applicability of our framework to help system
designers choose the appropriate metrics, without having to
delve into the mathematical details. We also hope to illustrate
the riveting intersection between the fields of information
privacy and information theory, in an attempt towards bridging
the gap between the respective communities. Moreover, the
fact that our metric boils down to an estimation error opens
the possibility of applying notions and results from the mature,
vast field of estimation theory [20].
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we provide an overview of privacy metrics with
an emphasis on those used in the three applications under
study: anonymous communications, location-based services
and statistical disclosure control.
A. Anonymous-Communication Systems and Location-Based
Services
Mixes were proposed by Chaum [16] in 1981, and are a ba-
sic building block for implementing high-latency anonymous
communications. A mix takes a number of input messages,
and outputs them in such a way that it is infeasible to link
an output to its corresponding input. In order to achieve this
goal, the mix changes the appearance (by encrypting and
padding messages) and the flow of messages (by delaying
and reordering them). Mixmaster [17] and Mixminion [18] are
more advanced versions of the Chaumian mix [16], and they
haven been deployed to provide anonymous email services.
Several metrics have been proposed in the literature to
assess the level of anonymity provided by anonymous-com-
munication systems (ACSs). Reiter and Rubin [21] define
the degree of anonymity as a probability 1 − p, where p
is the probability assigned by an attacker to the potential
initiators of a communication. In this model, users are more
anonymous as they appear (towards a certain adversary) to
be less likely of having sent a message, and the metric
is thus computed individually for each user and for each
communication. Berthold et al. [22] on the other hand define
the degree of anonymity as the binary logarithm of the number
of users of the system, which may be regarded as a Hartley
entropy. This metric only depends on the number of users of
the system, and does not take into account that some users
might appear as more likely senders of a message than others.
Information theoretic anonymity metrics were indepen-
dently proposed in two papers. The metric proposed by Ser-
jantov and Danezis [23] uses Shannon’s entropy as measure of
the effective anonymity set size. The metric proposed by Diaz
et al. [24] normalizes Shannon’s entropy to obtain a degree of
anonymity on a scale from 0 to 1.
Toth et al. [25] argue that Shannon entropy may not provide
relevant information to some users, as it considers the average
instead of the worst-case scenario for a particular user. They
suggest using instead a local anonymity measure computed
from min-entropy and max-entropy. Clauss and Schiffner [26]
proposed Re´nyi entropy as a generalization of Shannon, min-
and max-entropy-based anonymity metrics.
Other anonymity metrics in the literature include possi-
bilistic (instead of probabilistic) approaches, such as those
proposed by Syverson and Stubblebine [27], Mauw et al. [28],
or Feigenbaum et al. [29]. According to these metrics, subjects
are considered anonymous if the adversary cannot determine
their actions with absolute certainty. Finally, Edman et al. [30]
propose a combinatorial anonymity metric that measures the
amount of information needed to reveal the full set of rela-
tionships between the inputs and the outputs of a mix. Some
extensions of this model were proposed by Gierlichs et al. [31]
and by Bagai et al. [32].
Having examined the most relevant metrics in the field of
anonymous communications, now we briefly touch upon some
of the proposals intended for the scenario of LBS. Particularly,
the issue of quantifying privacy in this scenario has been
explored in [33] and revisited shortly afterwards in [34]. At a
conceptual level, we encounter the same underlying principle
3proposed here, in the sense that the authors propose to measure
privacy as the adversary’s expected estimation error for that
particular context. We shall discuss later in Sec. VI-A that their
specific metric for LBS may be construed as an illustrative
special case of our own work, and describe notable differences
with respect to our generic framework.
B. Privacy Criteria in Statistical Disclosure Control
In statistical disclosure control terminology, a microdata set is
a database whose records contain information at the level of in-
dividual respondents. In those databases, each row corresponds
to an individual and each column, to an attribute. According to
the nature of attributes, we may classify them into identifiers,
key attributes or quasi-identifiers, or confidential attributes.
On the one hand, identifiers allow to unequivocally identify
individuals. For example, it would be the case of social
security numbers or full names, which would be removed
before the publication of the microdata set. On the other hand,
key attributes are those attributes that, in combination, may be
linked with external information to reidentify the respondent
to whom the records in the microdata set refer. Last but not
least, confidential attributes contain sensitive information on
the respondents, such as health condition, political affiliation,
religion or salary.
k-Anonymity [9], [8] is the requirement that each tuple of
key attribute values be shared by at least k records in the
database. This condition is illustrated in Fig. 1, where a mi-
crodata set is k-anonymized before publishing it. Particularly,
this privacy criterion is enforced by using generalization and
suppression, two mechanisms by which key attribute values
are respectively coarsened and eliminated. As a result, all key
attribute values within each group are replaced by a common
tuple, and thus a record cannot be unambiguously linked to
any public database containing identifiers. Consequently, k-
anonymity is said to protect microdata against linking attacks.
Unfortunately, while this criterion prevents identity disclo-
sure, it may fail against the disclosure of the confidential
attribute. Concretely, suppose that a privacy attacker knows
Emmanuel’s key attribute values. If the attacker learns that
he is included in the released table depicted in Fig. 1(b),
then the attacker may conclude that this patient suffers from
hepatitis even though the attacker is unable to ascertain which
record belongs to this individual. This is known as similarity
attack, meaning that values of confidential attributes may
still be semantically similar. More generally, the skewness
attack exploits the difference between the prior distribution of
confidential attributes in the whole data set and the posterior
distribution of those attributes within a specific group.
All these vulnerabilities motivated the appearance of a
number of proposals, some of which we now overview. An en-
hancement of k-anonymity called p-sensitive k-anonymity [10]
incorporates the additional restriction that there be at least p
distinct values for each confidential attribute within each k-
anonymous group. With the aim of addressing the data utility
loss incurred by large values of p, l-diversity [11] proposes
instead that there be at least l “well-represented” values for
each confidential attribute. Unfortunately, both proposals are
still vulnerable to similarity attacks and skewness attacks.
Name Age Nationality 
Health  
Condition 
William 45 US Hepatitis B 
Emmanuel 42 French Hepatitis C 
Syme 47 Indian Hepatitis D 
Naoto 31 Japanese Diabetes 
Katharine 30 US Heart Disease 
Julia 36 British Heart Disease 
Key Attributes 
Identifier 
Attribute 
Confidential  
Attribute 
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(a) Original data
Age Nationality 
Health  
Condition 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis B 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis C 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis D 
< 40 * Diabetes 
< 40 * Heart Disease 
< 40 * Heart Disease 
Key Attributes 
Confidential  
Attribute 
(b) Perturbed data
Fig. 1: We apply the mechanisms of generalization and suppression to the
key attributes “age” and “nationality” respectively, in such a manner that the
requirement of 3-anonymity is satisfied. The upshot of such perturbation is
that each tuple of key attributes in the released table (b) is shared by at least
3 records. This means that an attacker who knows the key attribute values of
a particular respondent cannot ascertain the record of this respondent beyond
a subgroup of 3 records in any public database with identifier attributes.
In an attempt to overcome all these deficiencies, t-close-
ness [12] was proposed. A microdata set satisfies t-closeness
if, for each group of records with the same tuple of perturbed
key attribute values, a measure of discrepancy between the
posterior and prior distributions does not exceed a threshold t.
Inspired by this measure, [15] defines an (average) privacy
risk as the conditional Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence be-
tween the posterior and the prior distributions, a measure
that may be regarded as an averaged version of t-closeness.
Further, this average privacy risk is shown to be equal to
the mutual information between the confidential attributes and
the observed, perturbed key attributes, and, finally, a con-
nection is established with Shannon’s rate-distortion theory.
A related criterion named δ-disclosure is proposed in [13],
a yet stricter version that measures the maximum absolute
log ratio between the prior and the posterior distributions.
Lastly, [14] analyzes privacy for interactive databases, where
a randomized perturbation rule is applied to a true answer to a
query, before returning it to the user. Consider two databases
that differ only by one record, but are subject to a common
perturbation rule. Conceptually, the randomized perturbation
rule is said to satisfy the -differential privacy criterion if the
two corresponding probability distributions of the perturbed
answers are similar, according to a certain inequality. Later in
Sec. V-B we provide further details about these privacy criteria
and relate them in terms of our formulation.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we shall present our convention regarding
random variables (r.v.’s) and probability distributions. Next,
we shall introduce some elementary concepts for those readers
who are not familiar with Bayes decision theory (BDT).
Throughout this paper, we shall follow the convention of
using uppercase letters to denote r.v.’s, and lowercase letters
to the particular values they take on. We shall call alphabet the
values an r.v. takes on. Probability mass functions (PMFs) are
denoted by p, subindexed by the corresponding r.v. Accord-
ingly, pX(x) denotes the value of the function pX at x. We use
the notations pX|Y and pX|Y (x|y) equivalently. In addition,
we shall follow the notation in [35] to specify that two
4sequences ak and bk are approximately equal in the exponent
if limk→∞ 1k log
ak
bk
= 0. As an example to illustrate this
notation, consider the sequences ak = 23k+
√
k and bk = 23k,
and check that limk→∞ 1k log
ak
bk
= limk→∞ 1√k = 0, what
implies that they agree to first order in the exponent. Further,
throughout this work we shall denote the uniform distribution
by u. Last but not least, we shall use the notation xn to denote
a sequence x1, x2, . . . , xn.
Having adopted these conventions, now we recall the basics
on BDT. Namely, BDT is a statistical method that, funda-
mentally, uses a probabilistic model to analyze the making of
decisions under uncertainty and the costs associated with those
decisions [36], [37]. In general, Bayes decision principles may
be formulated in the following terms. Consider the uncertainty
refers to an unknown parameter modeled by an r.v. X . In
decision-theoretic terminology, this is also known as state of
nature. Let Y be another r.v. modeling an observation or
measurement on the state of nature. Suppose that, given a
particular observation y, we are required to make a decision on
the unknown. Let xˆ denote the estimator of X , that is, the rule
that provides a decision or estimate xˆ(y) for every possible
observation y. Clearly, any decision will be accompanied by a
cost. This is captured by the loss function d : (x, xˆ) 7→ d(x, xˆ),
which measures how costly the decision xˆ = xˆ(y) will
be when the unknown is x. However, since the actual loss
incurred by a decision cannot be calculated with absolute
certainty at the time the decision is made, BDT contemplates
the average loss associated with this decision. Concretely, the
Bayes conditional risk for an estimator xˆ is defined in the
discrete case as
R(y) = E[d(X, xˆ(y))|y] =
∑
x
pX|Y (x|y) d(x, xˆ(y)),
where the expectation is taken over the posterior probability
distribution pX|Y . According to this, the Bayes risk associated
with that estimator is defined as the average of the Bayes
conditional risk over all possible observations y, that is,
R = E E[d(X, xˆ(Y ))|Y ] =
∑
x,y
pX Y (x, y) d(x, xˆ(y)),
where the expectation is additionally taken over the probability
distribution of Y. Based on this definition, an estimator is
called Bayes estimator or Bayes decision rule, if it minimizes
the Bayes risk among all possible estimators. It turns out that
this optimal estimator is precisely
xˆBayes(y) = arg min
xˆ
E[d(X, xˆ)|y],
for all y; i.e., the Bayes estimator is the one that minimizes
the Bayes conditional risk for every observation.
Once some of the basic elements in Bayes analysis have
been examined, we would like to establish a connection
between maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator and Bayes
estimator. With this aim, first recall that a MAP estimator,
as the name implies, is the estimator that maximizes the
posterior distribution. Now consider the loss function d to be
the Hamming distance between x and xˆ, which is an indicator
function, and recall that the expectation of an indicator r.v. is
the probability of the event it is based on. Mathematically,
E[dHamming(X, xˆ)|y] = P{X 6= xˆ|y},
Unknown  Input Decision 
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Attacker 
identifier or 
confidential attributes 
perturbed table 
and external table 
estimate of identifier or 
confidential attributes 
System key attributes 
perturbed key 
attributes 
TABLE I: Simplified representation of our notation.
and consequently,
xˆMAP(y) = arg min
xˆ
P{X 6= xˆ|y}
= arg max
xˆ
P{X = xˆ|y}. (1)
In conclusion, Bayes and MAP estimators coincide when the
loss function is Hamming distance.
IV. MEASURING PRIVACY AS AN ATTACKER’S
ESTIMATION ERROR
This section presents our first contribution, a general frame-
work that lays the foundation for the establishment of a unified
measurement of privacy. However, it is not until Sec. V
where we shall show that a number of privacy criteria may
be regarded as particular cases of our proposal. Previously,
Sec. IV-A introduces our notation. Next, Sec. IV-B describes
the adversarial model. In Sec. IV-C we present our privacy
metric, and finally, in Sec. IV-D, we illustrate the proposed
formulation with a simple but i sightful example.
A. Mathematical Assumptions and Notation
In this section, we provide the notation that we shall use
throughout this work. To this end, we first introduce the key
actors of the proposed framework:
• a user, who wishes to protect their privacy;
• a (trusted) system, to which each user entrusts their
private data for its protection; the unique purpose of
this entity is to guarantee the privacy of the user, and
with this aim, the system may use any privacy-preserving
mechanism at its disposal;
• and an attacker, who strives to disclose private informa-
tion about this user.
To clarify the elements involved in our framework, consider
a conceptually-simple approach to anonymous Web browsing,
consisting in a TTP acting as an intermediary between Internet
users and Web servers. From the perspective of our model, the
users would be those subscribed to the anonymous proxy; the
system would be this proxy; and the attackers those servers
that attempt to compromise users’ privacy from their Web
browsing activity.
In the following, the term r.v. is used with full generality
to include categorical or numerical data, vectors, tuples or se-
quences of mixed components, but for mathematical simplicity
we shall henceforth assume that all r.v.’s in the paper have
finite alphabets.
• The attacker’s unknown or uncertainty is denoted by the
r.v. X , which models the private information about a user
that the attacker wishes to ascertain.
• The system’s input is represented by the r.v. X ′ and refers
to user’s data required by the system to make a decision.
5Unknown  Input Decision 
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departure times of the 
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TABLE II: Description of the variables used in our notation in the special
case of SDC. Often, X = X′ and Y = Y ′.
• The systems’s decision is model d by the r.v. Y ′ and
denotes discl sed information, perhaps part of X ′, or a
perturbation.
• The attacker’s input is denoted by the r.v. Y and captures
any evidence or measurement the attacker has about the
unknown. As its name indicates, this variable models
the information that serves as input for the adversary
to ascertain X . In some cases, Y may be directly the
information revealed by the system, i.e., Y = Y ′. That
is, the only information available to the attacker is exactly
that disclosed by the system. In other circumstances, the
attacker may observe a perturbed version of Y ′, maybe
together with background knowledge about the unknown.
In such cases, we have Y 6= Y ′. Since the attacker’s
input is, in fact, the information observed by the attacker,
directly from the system or indirectly from other sources,
throughout this work we shall use the terms attacker’s
input and attacker’s observation indistinguishably to refer
to the variable Y .
• The attacker’s decision is modeled by the r.v. Xˆ and
represents the attacker’s estimate of X from Y .
In order to clarify this notation, we provide an example
in which the above variables are put in the context of SDC.
In this scenario, the data publisher plays the role of the
system. Concretely, X may represent identifying or confiden-
tial attribute values the attacker endeavors to ascertain with
regard to an individual appearing in a released table. The
individuals contained in this table are what we call users.
The system’s input becomes now the key attribute values that
the publisher has about the individuals. On the other hand,
Y ′ is the perturbed version of those values, which jointly with
the (unperturbed) confidential attribute values, constitute the
released table. Furthermore, the attacker’s input consists of
the released table and, possibly, background knowledge the
privacy attacker may have. For example, this could be the case
of a voter registration list. In the end, the attacker’s decision
is the estimate of X . All this information is shown in Table II.
Similarly, now we specify the variables of our framework
in the special case of a mix. Under this scenario, the mix
represents the system, whose objective is to hide the cor-
respondence between the incoming and outgoing messages.
Precisely, the attacker’s uncertainty is this correspondence.
The system’s input and system’s decision are the arrival
and departure times of the messages, respectively. On the
other hand, the information available to the attacker, i.e., the
attacker’s observation Y , consists of X ′, Y ′ and the design
parameters of the mix. Finally, Xˆ is the attacker’s decision on
the correspondence between the messages. This is depicted in
Fig. 2 and summarized in Table III.
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Fig. 2: Our framework is put in the context of mixes.
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TABLE III: Description of the variables used in our notation in the special
case of mixes.
B. Adversarial Model
The consideration of a framework that encompasses a variety
of privacy criteria necessarily requires the formalization of the
attacker’s model. In this spirit, we now proceed to present the
parameters that characterize this model.
Firstly, we shall contemplate an adversarial model in which
the attacker uses a Bayes (best) decision rule. Conceptually,
this corresponds to the estimation made by an attacker that
uses optimally the available information, as we formally
argued in Sec. III. Namely, for every possible decision of the
system resulting in an observation y, the attacker will make
a Bayes decision xˆ(y) on X . With regard to this attacker’s
decision rule, we would like to remark the fact that, whereas
it is a deterministic estimator, the system’s decision is assumed
to be a randomized perturbation rule given by pY ′ |X′ . As
a consequence of this, it is clear that the system does not
leak any private information when deciding Y ′, provided that
Y ′ and X ′ are statistically independent.
Secondly, as explained in Sec. III, we shall require to
evaluate the cost of each decision made by the attacker.
For this purpose, we consider the attacker’s distortion func-
tion dA : (x, xˆ) 7→ dA(x, xˆ), which measures the degree of
dissatisfaction that the attacker experiences when X = x
and Xˆ = xˆ(y). Similarly, we contemplate the system’s
distortion function dS : (x′, y′) 7→ dS(x′, y′), which reflects the
extent to which the system, and therefore the user, is discontent
when Y ′ = y′ and X ′ = x′.
A crucial distinction in the type of attacker’s distortion
function dA considered will be whether it captures a sort of
geometry over the symbols of the alphabet, or not. The most
evident example of distortion function that does not take into
account this geometry is the Hamming function, which we al-
ready introduced at the end of Sec. III. Concretely, this binary
metric just indicates whether x and xˆ coincide, and provides
6no more information about the discrepancy between them. On
the other hand, the squared error loss dA(x, xˆ) = (x − xˆ)2
and the absolute error loss dA(x, xˆ) = |x − xˆ| are just two
commonly-used examples of distortion functions that do rely
or induce a certain geometry.
C. Definition of our Privacy Criterion
Bearing in mind the above considerations, and consistently
with Sec. III, we define conditional privacy as
P(y) = E[dA(X, xˆ(y))|y], (2)
which is the estimation error incurred by the attacker, con-
ditioned on the observation y. Based on this definition, we
contemplate two possible measures of privacy. In particular,
we define worst-case privacy as
Pmin = min
y
P(y). (3)
On the other hand, we define average privacy as
Pavg = EP(Y ) = E dA(X, xˆ(Y )), (4)
which is the average of the conditional privacy over all
possible observations y.
In order to measure the utility loss caused by the pertur-
bation of the original data, we define the average distortion
as
D = E dS(X ′, Y ′). (5)
According to these definitions, a privacy-protecting system
and an attacker would adopt the following strategies. Namely,
the system would select the decision rule pY ′ |X′ that max-
imizes either the average privacy or the worst-case privacy,
while not allowing the average distortion to exceed a certain
threshold. On the other hand, the attacker would choose the
Bayes estimator, which would lead to the minimization of both
measures of privacy. The reason behind this is that the Bayes
estimator also minimizes the conditional privacy, as stated in
Sec. III.
On a different note, we would like to remark that a privacy
risk R in lieu of P could be defined for −dA(x, xˆ(y)) instead
of dA(x, xˆ(y)). An analogous argument justifies the use of
utility instead of distortion.
Last but not least, we would also like to note that, in the
special case when the unknown variable X models the identity
of a user, our measure of privacy may be regarded, in fact, as
a measure of anonymity.
D. Example
Next, we present a simple example that sheds some light on
the formulation introduced in the previous sections.
For the sake of simplicity, consider X ′ = X , that is, the
system’s input is the confidential information that needs to be
protected. Suppose that X is a binary r.v. with P{X = 0} =
P{X = 1} = 1/2. In order to hinder privacy attackers in their
efforts to ascertain X , for each possible outcome x, the system
will disclose a perturbed version y′. Namely, with probability p
the system will decide to reveal the complementary value of x,
whereas with probability 1−p no perturbation will be applied,
i.e., y′ = x. Note that, in this example, the system’s decision
Pavg
U
p =
1
2
p = 0
u0
Pavgmax p
¤
Fig. 3: Representation of the trade-off curve between privacy and utility for
the example.
rule is completely determined by p, for which we conveniently
impose the condition 0 6 p < 1/2.
At this point, we shall assume that the attacker only has
access to the disclosed information Y ′, and therefore the
attacker’s input Y boils down to it. We anticipate that, through-
out this work, this supposition will be usual. In addition,
we shall consider the attacker’s distortion function to be the
Hamming distance. However, as commented on in Sec. III, this
implies that the Bayes estimator matches the MAP estimator.
According to this observation, it is easy to demonstrate that
the attacker’s best decision is Xˆ = Y. Therefore, the average
privacy (4) becomes
Pavg = P{X 6= Xˆ} = P{X 6= Y } = P{X 6= Y ′} = p.
On the other hand, if we suppose that the system’s distortion
function is also the Hamming distance, from (5), it follows
that
D = P{X ′ 6= Y ′} = P{X 6= Y ′} = p.
Based on these two results, we now proceed to describe the
strategy that the attacker would follow. To this end, we define
the average utility U as 1−D. According to this, the system
would strive to maximize the average privacy with respect to p,
subject to the constraint U > u0. Fig. 3 illustrates this simple
optimization problem by showing the trade-off curve between
privacy and utility. In this example, it is straightforward to
verify that the optimal value of average privacy is Pavgmax =
1− u0, for 1/2 < u0 6 1.
V. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present our second contribution, namely,
the interpretation of several well-known privacy criteria as
particular cases of our more general definition of privacy. The
arguments behind the justification of these privacy metrics as
a particularization of our criterion are based on numerous
concepts from the fields of information theory, probability
theory and BDT. In this section, we therefore approach this
issue from a theoretical perspective; however, we refer those
readers not particularly interested in the mathematical details
to Sec. VII.
For a comprehensive exposition of these arguments, the
underlying assumptions and concepts will be expounded in
a systematic manner, following the points sketched in Fig. 4.
As mentioned in Sec. IV-B and illustrated by the first branch
of the tree depicted in this figure, our starting point makes the
significant distinction between attacker’s distortion measures
based on the Hamming distance and the rest, according to
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Fig. 4: The arguments that lead to the interpretation of several privacy metrics
as particular cases of our definition of privacy are conceptually organized in
the above points. As can be observed, these arguments clearly depend on
the attacker’s distortion function, namely on the geometry of this function
(Hamming or non-Hamming) and on the knowledge the user has about it,
i.e., it is known or unknown to the user. Other parameters include the nature
of the variables of our framework, and obviously the attacker’s strategy.
whether we wish to capture a certain, gradual measure of dis-
tance between alphabet values beyond sheer symbol equality.
It is important to recall from Sec. III that in the case of a
Hamming distortion measure, expected distortion boils down
to probability of error, yielding a different class of estimation
problems.
Bearing in mind the above remark, in Sec. V-A we shall
contemplate the case when the attacker’s distortion function
is the Hamming distance, whereas in Sec. V-B we shall deal
with the more general case in which dA can be any other
distortion function. In the special case of Hamming distance,
we consider two alternatives for the variables in Table I:
single-occurrence and multiple-occurrence data. The former
case considers the variables to be tuples of a small number of
components, and the latter case assumes that these variables
are sequences of data. In the scenario of single-occurrence
data, we shall establish a connection between Hartley’s entropy
and our privacy metric, which will allow us to interpret k-
anonymity, l-diversity and min-entropy criteria as particular
cases of our framework. The arguments that will enable us to
justify this connection stem from MAP estimation, BDT and
the concept of confidence set. On the other hand, when we
consider multiple-occurrence data, we shall use the asymp-
totic equipartition property (AEP) to argue that the Shannon
entropy, as a measure of privacy, is a characterization of the
cardinality of a high-confidence set of sequences.
In the more general case in which the attacker’s distortion
function is not the Hamming distance, we shall explore two
possible scenarios. On the one hand, we shall consider the
case where this function is known to the system. Under the
assumption of a Bayes attacker’s strategy, we shall use BDT to
justify the system’s best decision rule. On the other hand, we
shall contemplate the case in which the attacker’s distortion
function is unknown to the system. Specifically, this scenario
will allow us to connect our framework to several privacy
criteria through the concept of total variation, provided that
the attacker uses MAP estimation.
A. Hamming Distortion
In this section, we shall analyze the special case when
the attacker’s distortion function is the Hamming distance,
commented on in Secs. III and IV-B. In addition, we shall
contemplate two cases for the variables of our framework:
single-occurrence and multiple-occurrence data.
1) Single Occurrence: This section considers the scenario
in which the variables defined in Sec. IV-A are tuples of a rela-
tively small number of components, including both categorical
and numerical data, defined on a finite alphabet. In order to
establish a connection between some of the most popular
privacy metrics and our criterion, first we shall introduce
the concept of confidence set and briefly recall a riveting
generalization of Shannon’s entropy.
Consider an r.v. X taking on values in the alphabet X . A
confidence set C with confidence p is defined as a subset of X
such that P{X ∈ C } = p. In the case of continuous-valued
random scalars, confidence sets commonly take the form of
intervals. In these terms, it is clear that a privacy attacker
aimed at ascertaining X will benefit the most from those
confidence sets whose cardinality is reduced substantially with
respect to the original alphabet size, with high confidence. To
connect the concept of confidence set to our interpretation of
privacy as an attacker’s estimation error, consider an attacker
model where the attacker only takes into account the shape of
the PMF of the unknown X to identify a confidence set C for
some desired confidence p, and beyond that, assumes all the
included members equally relevant. This last assumption may
be interpreted as an investigation on a tractable list of potential
identities, carried out in parallel. MAP estimation within that
set, considering it uniformly distributed, leads to an estimation
error of 1− 1|C | , that is, a bijection of its cardinality.
In our interpretations, we further use the Re´nyi entropy, a
family of functionals widely used in information theory as a
measure of uncertainty. More specifically, Re´nyi’s entropy of
order α is defined as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log
n∑
i=1
pX(xi)
α,
where pX is the PMF of an r.v. X that takes on values in
the alphabet X = {x1, . . . , xn}. In the important case when
α is 0, Re´nyi’s entropy is essentially given by the support set
of pX , that is,
H0(X) = log |{x ∈ X : pX(x) > 0}| .
In this particular case, Re´nyi’s entropy is referred to as
Hartley’s entropy. Evidently, when pX is strictly positive, the
support set becomes the alphabet and H0(X) = log n. Under
this assumption, the Hartley entropy can be understood as a
confidence set with p = 100%. On the other hand, in the limit
when α approaches 1, Re´nyi’s entropy reduces to Shannon’s
H1(X) = −
∑
i
pX(xi) log pX(xi).
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Attribute 
Key Attributes 
Confidential 
Attribute 
William 45 US Hepatitis B 
Emmanuel 42 French Hepatitis C 
Syme 47 Indian Hepatitis D 
Naoto 31 Japanese Viral Infection 
Katharine 30 US Heart Disease 
Julia 36 British Heart Disease 
Perturbed  
Key Attributes 
Confidential 
Attribute 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis B 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis C 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis D 
< 40 * Viral Infection 
< 40 * Heart Disease 
< 40 * Heart Disease 
X X0 Y = Y 0
ypXjY (xjy) = 1=k
two-columns version 
k-anonymity 
(a) Original data (b) Perturbed data 
Fig. 5: A data publisher plans to release a 3-anonymized microdata set. To this end, the publisher must enforce that, for a given tuple of key attribute values
in (b), the probability of ascertain the identifier value of the corresponding record in (a) must be at most 1/3.
Lastly, in the limit as α goes to ∞, the Re´nyi entropy
approaches the min-entropy
H∞(X) = min
i
− log pX(xi) = − log max
i
pX(xi).
We shall shortly interpret min-entropy, Shannon’s entropy
and Hartley’s entropy within our general framework of privacy
as an attacker estimation error, when Hamming distance is
used as a distortion measure, first for single occurrences of a
target information, and later for multiple occurrences. For now,
we could loosely consider an attacker striving to ascertain the
outcome of the finite-alphabet r.v. X , and the effect of the
dispersion of its PMF on such task. Conceptually, we could
then regard these three types of entropies simply as worst-
case, average-case and best-case measurements of privacy,
respectively, on account of the fact that
H∞(X) 6 H1(X) 6 H0(X), (6)
with equality if, and only if, X is uniformly distributed.
More specifically, the min-entropy H∞(X) is the minimum
of the surprisal or self-information − log pX(xi), whereas the
Shannon entropy H1(X) is a weighted average of such loga-
rithms, and finally, the Hartley entropy H0(X) optimistically
measures the cardinality of the entire set of possible values of
X regardless of their likelihood.
After showing the Hartley, Shannon and min entropies are
particular cases of Re´nyi’s entropy, now we go on to describe
a scenario that will allow us to relate our privacy metric to
an extensively-used criterion. Specifically, we focus on the
important case of SDC, where the data publisher plays the
system’s role. In this scenario, a data publisher wishes to
release a microdata set and, before distributing it, the publisher
applies some algorithm [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] to
enforce the k-anonymity requirement [8], [9]. As mentioned
in Sec. II-B, the objective of a linking attack is to unveil the
identity of the individuals appearing in a released table by
linking the records in this table to any public data set including
identifiers. Since k-anonymity is aimed at protecting the data
against this attack, in our scenario the attacker’s unknown X
becomes the user identity. The other variables shown in
Table II are as follows: X ′ are the key attribute values, Y ′ are
the perturbed key attribute values, the attacker’s observation Y
is assumed to be Y ′, and finally, Xˆ is an estimate of the
identity of a user. Fig. 5 illustrates this particular case.
In order to protect the data set from identity disclosure, the
algorithm must ensure that, for any observation y consisting
in a tuple of perturbed key attribute values in the released
table, the identifier value of the corresponding record in the
original table cannot be ascertained beyond a subgroup of at
least k records. As we shall see next, this requirement will
be reflected mathematically by assuming that the probability
distribution pX|Y (·|y) of the identifier value, conditioned on
the observation y, is the uniform distribution on a set of at
least k individuals. Lastly, we consider the more general case
in which Y consists of Y ′ and any background knowledge.
That said, our adversarial model contemplates an attacker
who uses a MAP estimator, which, as shown in Sec. III, is
equivalent to the Bayes estimator. Under this model, given an
observation y, the conditional privacy (2) becomes
P(y) = P{X 6= xˆ(y)|y} = 1−max
x
pX|Y (x|y), (7)
which precisely is the MAP error εMAP , conditioned on that
observation y; in terms of min-entropy, we may recast our
metric as
P(y) = εMAP = 1− 2−H∞(X|y),
which shows that the concept of min-entropy is intimately re-
lated to MAP decoding. If we finally apply the aforementioned
uniformity condition of pX|Y (·|y), and assume that this PMF
is the uniform distribution on a group of exactly k individuals,
that is, ui = 1/k for all i = 1, . . . , k, then
P(y) = 1− 1/k = 1− 2−H0(X|y),
which expresses the conditional privacy in terms of Hartley’s
entropy. In a nutshell, the k-anonymity criterion may be inter-
preted as a special case of our privacy measure, determined
by this Re´nyi’s entropy.
After examining this first interpretation, next we shall
explore an enhancement of k-anonymity. As argued in Sec. III,
this criterion does not protect against confidential attribute
disclosure. In an effort to address this limitation, several pri-
vacy metrics were proposed. In the remainder of this section,
we shall focus on one of these approaches. In particular, we
shall consider the l-diversity metric [11], which builds on the
k-anonymity principle and aims at overcoming the attribute
disclosure problem.
As mentioned in Sec. II-B, a microdata set satisfies l-
diversity if, for each group of records sharing a tuple of key
9Identifier 
Attribute 
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Attribute 
Angela 41 US Hepatitis C 
Emmanuel 42 French Hepatitis C 
Patrick 49 Irish Lung Cancer 
Andrea 40 Italian Lung Cancer 
Naoto 31 Japanese Viral Infection 
Katharine 30 US Heart Disease 
Julia 36 British Heart Disease 
George 35 US Viral Infection 
Perturbed  
Key Attributes 
Confidential 
Attribute 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis C 
40 – 50  * Hepatitis C 
40 – 50  * Lung Cancer 
40 – 50 * Lung Cancer 
< 40 * Viral Infection 
< 40 * Heart Disease 
< 40 * Heart Disease 
< 40 * Viral Infection 
X0 Y = Y 0
y
X
pXjY (xjy) = 1=l
two-columns version 
l-diversity 
(a) Original data (b) Perturbed data 
Fig. 6: In this example, the 2-diversity principle is applied to a microdata set. In order to meet this requirement, we assume that, for each group of records
with the same tuple of perturbed key attribute values, the probability distribution of the confidential attribute value in (b) is the uniform distribution on a set
of at least 2 values.
attribute values in the perturbed table, there are at least l “well-
represented” values for each confidential attribute. Depending
on the definition of well-represented, this criterion can reduce
to distinct l-diversity, which is equivalent to l-sensitive k-
anonymity, or be more restrictive. Concretely, a microdata
is said to meet the entropy l-diversity requirement if, for
each group of records with the same tuple of perturbed key
attribute values, the entropy of each confidential attribute is at
least log l.
In our new scenario, a data publisher, still playing the
system’s role, applies an algorithm on the microdata set to
enforce the l-diversity principle. Since the aim of this criterion
is to protect the data against attribute disclosure, we consider
that the attacker’s unknown X refers to the confidential at-
tribute. The other variables remain the same as in our previous
interpretation.
Having said that, we shall make the assumption that the l-
diversity requirement is met by enforcing that, for a given
tuple y of perturbed key attribute values, the probability
distribution pX|Y (·|y) of the confidential attribute within the
group of records sharing this tuple is the uniform distribution
on a set of at least l values. This is depicted in Fig. 6. Note
that this assumption entails that the data fulfill both the distinct
and entropy l-diversity requirements. Lastly, we shall suppose
again that the attacker uses MAP estimator.
As mentioned before, under the premise of a MAP attacker,
our measure of conditional privacy boils down to the MAP
error (7). If we also apply the assumption above about the
uniformity of pX|Y (·|y), and suppose that this distribution
is uniform on a group of l individuals, then the conditional
privacy yields
P(y) = 1− 1/l = 1− 2−H0(X|y),
which expresses our privacy metric again in terms of Hartley’s
entropy. In short, the l-diversity criterion lends itself to be
interpreted as a particular case of our more general privacy
measure.
2) Multiple Occurrences: In this section, we shall consider
the case when the variables shown in Table I are sequences of
categorical and numerical data but in a finite alphabet. Recall
from Sec. III that we use the notation Xk to denote a sequence
X1, . . . , Xk.
The special case that we contemplate now could perfectly
model the scenario in which a user interacts with an LBS
provider, through an intermediate system protecting the user’s
location privacy. In this scenario, a user would submit queries
along with their locations to the trusted system. An example
would be the query “Where is the nearest parking garage?”,
accompanied by the geographic coordinates of the user’s
current location. As many approaches suggest in the literature
of private LBSs, the system would perturb the user coordinates
and submit them to the LBS provider. Concordantly, we may
choose Euclidean distance as the natural attacker’s distortion
measure. Alternatively, if the attacker’s interest lies in whether
the user is at home, at work, shopping for groceries or at the
movies, in order to profile their behavior, or more simply,
whether the user is at a given sensitive location or not, then
the appropriate model for the location space becomes discrete,
and Hamming distance is more suited.
In this context, the consideration of sequences of discrete
r.v.’s in our notation makes sense. Specifically, an attacker
would endeavor to ascertain the sequence Xk of k unknown
locations visited by the user, from the sequence Y ′k of k
perturbed locations that the system would submit to the LBS.
Put differently, the attacker’s unknown would be the location
data the user conveys to the system, i.e., Xk = X ′k, and the
information available to the adversary the perturbed version
of this data, that is, Y k = Y ′k.
Having motivated the case of sequences of data, in this
section we shall establish a connection between our metric
and Shannon’s entropy as a measure of privacy. But in order
to emphasize this connection, first we briefly recall one of
the pillars of information theory: the asymptotic equipartition
property [35], which derives from the weak law of large
numbers and results in important consequences in this field.
Consider a sequence Xk of k independent, identically
distributed (i.i.d.) r.v.’s, drawn according to pX , with alphabet
size n. Loosely speaking, the AEP states that among all
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possible nk sequences, there exists a typical subset T k of
sequences almost certain to occur. More precisely, for any
 > 0, there exists a k sufficiently large such that P{T k } >
1 − , and |T k | 6 2k(H1(X)+). A similar argument called
joint AEP [35] also holds for the i.i.d. sequences (Xk, Y k)
of length k drawn according to
∏k
i=1 pX Y (xi, yi). Another
information-theoretic result is related to those sequences xk
that are jointly typical with a given typical sequence yk.
Namely, the set of all these sequences xk is referred to as
the conditionally typical set T X
k|yk
 and satisfies, on the one
hand, that P{T Xk|yk } > 1 −  for large k, and on the
other, that its cardinality is bounded by Shannon’s conditional
entropy, |T k | 6 2k(H1(X|Y )+). Further, it turns out that these
conditionally typical sequences are equally likely, with proba-
bility 2−kH1(X|Y ), approximately in the exponent. While the
most likely sequence may in fact not belong to the typical set,
the set of typical sequences encompasses a sufficiently large
number of sequences that amount to a probability arbitrarily
close to certainty.
Next, we proceed to interpret, under the perspective of our
framework, the Shannon entropy as a measure of privacy. To
this end, consider the scenario in which a privacy attacker
observes a typical Y k and strives to estimate the unknown Xk.
Conveniently, we assume Xk = X ′k and Y k = Y ′k,
which models the LBS example described before, provided
that the attacker ignores any spatial-temporal constraint. In
other words, we model a scenario without memory and hence
suppose that (Xi, Yi) are i.i.d. drawn according to pX Y . We
would like to stress that the consideration of this simplified
model is just for the purpose of providing a simple, clear
example that illustrates the application of our framework.
Having said this, in the terms above we may regard T X
k|yk
 as
a set of arbitrarily high confidence with cardinality 2kH1(X|Y ),
approximately in the exponent.
The upshot is that the Shannon (conditional) entropy of
an unknown r.v. (given an observed r.v.) is an approximate
measure of the size of a high-confidence set, measure suitable
for attacker models based on the estimation of sequences,
rather than individual samples. Moreover, within this confi-
dence set, sequences are equally likely, approximately in the
exponent, concordantly with the interpretation of confidence-
set cardinality as a measure of privacy made in Sec. V-A1 on
single occurrences. Even though for simplicity our argument
focused on memoryless sequences, the Shannon-McMillan-
Breiman theorem is a generalization of the AEP to stationary
ergodic sequences, in terms of entropy rates [38].
Finally, we mentioned that the most likely sequence may
in fact be atypical, and thus Shannon entropy is not directly
applicable to MAP estimation over the entire set of sequences.
Nevertheless, because the most likely memoryless sequence is
simply a repetition of the most likely symbol, MAP estimation
on sequences is a trivial extension of the argument on min-
entropy presented in Sec. V-A1.
B. Non-Hamming Distortion
This section investigates the complementary case described
in Sec. V in which the attacker’s distortion function is not
the Hamming distance. Particularly, in this section we turn
our attention to the scenario of SDC, and contemplate two
possible alternatives regarding the system’s knowledge on the
function dA—first, when this function is known to the data
publisher, and secondly, when it is unknown. Under the former
assumption, the system would definitely use BDT to find the
decision rule pY ′|X′ which maximizes either the worst-case
privacy (3) or the average privacy (4), and satisfies a con-
straint on average distortion. The latter assumption, however,
describes a more general and realistic scenario. The remainder
of this subsection precisely interprets several privacy criteria
under this assumption. The only piece of information which
is though known to the publisher is dmax = maxx,xˆ dA(x, xˆ),
that is, the maximum value attained by said function.
Bearing in mind the above consideration, in our new sce-
nario a privacy attacker endeavors to guess the confidential
attribute value of a particular respondent in the released table.
Initially, the attacker has a prior belief given by pX , that is,
the distribution of that confidential attribute value in the whole
table. Later, the attacker observes that the user belongs to a
group of records sharing a tuple of perturbed key attribute
values y, which is supposed to coincide with the system’s de-
cision y′. Based on this observation, the attacker updates their
prior belief and obtains the posterior distribution pX|Y (·|y).
This situation is illustrated in Fig. 7. A fundamental question
that arises in this context is how much privacy the released
table leaks as a result of that observation. In the remainder of
this section, we elaborate on this question and provide an upper
bound on the reduction in privacy incurred by the disclosure
of that information.
1) Total Variation and t-Closeness: For notational sim-
plicity, we occasionally rename the posterior and the prior
distributions pX|Y (·|y) and pX simply with the symbols p
and q, respectively, but bear in mind that p is a PMF of
x parametrized by y. In addition, we shall assume that the
attacker adopts a MAP strategy. More precisely, xˆp and xˆq
will denote the attacker’s estimate when using the distributions
p and q. Under these assumptions, the reduction (prior minus
posterior) in conditional privacy can be expressed as
∆P(y) = Ep dA(X, xˆq)− Ep dA(X, xˆp)
= Ep dA(X, xˆq)− Eq dA(X, xˆq) + Eq dA(X, xˆq)
− Eq dA(X, xˆp) + Eq dA(X, xˆp)− Ep dA(X, xˆp),
where Ep and Eq denotes that the expectation is taken over
the posterior and the prior distributions, respectively, as PMFs
of x.
In this expression, the first two terms can be upper bounded
by dmax
∑
x |px − qx|, since
∑
x(px − qx) 6
∑
x |px − qx|.
Clearly, this same bound applies to the last two terms. On the
other hand, the remaining terms Eq dA(X, xˆq)−Eq dA(X, xˆp)
are upper bounded by 0, since the error incurred by xˆq is
smaller than or equal to that of xˆp. In the end, we obtain that
∆P(y) 6 2 dmax
∑
x
|px − qx| .
At this point, we shall briefly review the concept of total
variation. For this purpose, consider P and Q to be two
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Identifier 
Attribute 
Key Attributes 
Confidential 
Attribute 
William 45 US AIDS 
Stephen 46 Danish Heart Disease 
Chloe 49 Irish Lung Cancer 
Jonas 42 German Viral Infection 
Jean 37 French AIDS 
Yasmin 39 Brazilian AIDS 
Ethan 34 US Viral Infection 
Oscar 38 Swedish AIDS 
X0 Y = Y 0
y
X
one-column version 
Perturbed  
Key Attributes 
Confidential 
Attribute 
40 – 50  * AIDS 
40 – 50  * Heart Disease 
40 – 50  * Lung Cancer 
40 – 50 * Viral Infection 
< 40 * AIDS 
< 40 * AIDS 
< 40 * Viral Infection 
< 40 * AIDS 
pXjY (¢jy)
pX
(a) Original data (b) Perturbed data 
Fig. 7: At first, an attacker believes that the probability that a user appearing in (b) suffer from AIDS is 1/2. However, after observing that the user’s record
is one of the last four records, this probability becomes 3/4.
PMFs over X . In probability theory, the total variation distance
between P and Q is
TV(P ‖Q) = 12
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)| .
Furthermore, recall that, in information theory, Pinsker’s in-
equality relates the total variation distance with the KL di-
vergence. Particularly, TV(P ‖Q) 6
√
2
2
√
D(P ‖Q). Having
stated this result, now the total variation distance permits
writing the upper bound on ∆P(y) in terms of the KL
divergence:
∆P(y) 6 4 dmaxTV(p ‖ q) 6 2
√
2 dmax
√
D(p ‖ q),
where the last inequality follows from Pinsker’s inequality.
Returning to the notation of prior and posterior distributions,
∆P(y) 6 4 dmaxTV(pX|Y (·|y) ‖ pX)
6 2
√
2 dmax
√
D(pX|Y (·|y) ‖ pX). (8)
This upper bound allows to establish a connection between
our privacy criterion and t-closeness [12]. The latter criterion
boils down to defining a maximum discrepancy between the
posterior and prior distributions,
t = max
y
D(pX|Y (·|y) ‖ pX).
Under this definition and on account of (8),
∆P(y) 6 2
√
2 dmax
√
t.
Therefore, t-closeness is essentially equivalent to bounding the
decrease in conditional privacy.
On a different note, we would like to make a comment
on an issue of a purely technical nature. Clearly, in light of
inequality (8), the minimization of either the total variation
distance or the KL divergence leads to the minimization
of an upper bound on ∆P(y). However, the fact that the
KL divergence imposes a worse upper bound suggests us
considering it when the resulting mathematical model be more
tractable than the one built upon the total variation distance.
2) Mutual Information and Rate-Distortion Theory: The
privacy criterion proposed in [15], called (average) privacy
risk R, is the average-case version of t-closeness. Formally,
R is a conditional KL divergence, the average discrepancy
between the posterior and the prior distributions, which turns
out to coincide with the mutual information between the
confidential data X and the observation Y :
R = EY D(pX|Y (·|Y ) ‖ pX)
= EY EX|Y
[
log
pX|Y (X|Y )
pX(X)
∣∣∣∣Y ]
= E log
pX|Y (X|Y )
pX(X)
= I(X;Y ).
Directly from their definition, R 6 t, meaning that t-closeness
is a stricter measure of privacy risk. Because the KL diver-
gence is itself an average, R is clearly an average-case privacy
criterion, but t closeness is technically a maximum of an ex-
pectation, a hybrid between average case and worst case. The
next subsection will comment on a third, purely worst-case
criterion. When choosing a privacy criterion, it is important
to keep in mind that optimizing a privacy mechanism for the
best worst-case scenario will in general yield a worse average
case, and viceversa.
Further, we conveniently rewrite inequality (8) as
1
8 d2max
∆P(y)2 6 D(pX|Y (·|y) ‖ pX).
By averaging over all possible observation y, the right-hand
side of this inequality becomes the privacy risk R, which we
showed to be equal to the mutual information. This leads to a
bound on the privacy reduction in terms of mutual information,
1
8 d2max
E
[
∆P(Y )2] 6 I(X;Y ).
Based on this observation, it is clear that the minimization
of the mutual information contributes to the minimization
of an upper bound on ∆P(y). With this in mind, we now
consider the more general scenario in which Y ′ and Y need
not necessarily coincide, and contemplate the case of a data
publisher. Concretely, from the perspective of a publisher, we
would choose a randomized perturbation rule pY ′|X′ with
the aim of minimizing the mutual information between X
and Y , and consequently protecting user privacy. Evidently, the
publisher would also need to guarantee the utility of the data to
a certain extent, and thus impose a constraint on the average
distortion. In conclusion, the data publisher would strive to
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solve the optimization problem
min
pY ′|X′
E dU(X
′,Y ′)6D
I(X;Y ), (9)
which surprisingly bears a strong resemblance with the rate-
distortion problem in the field of information theory.
More specifically, the above optimization problem is a gen-
eralization of a well-known, extensively studied information-
theoretic problem with more than half a century of maturity.
Namely, the problem of lossy compression of source data with
a distortion criterion, first proposed by Shannon in 1959 [39].
The importance of this lies in the fact that some of
the information-theoretic results and methods for the rate-
distortion problem can be extended to the problem (9). For
example, in the special case when X = X ′ and Y = Y ′, our
more general problem boils down to Shannon’s rate-distortion
and, interestingly, can be computed with the Blahut-Arimoto
algorithm [35].
Bear in mind that the very same metric, or conceptually
equivalent variations thereof, may in fact be interpreted un-
der different perspectives. Recall, for instance, that mutual
information is the difference between an unconditional entropy
and a conditional entropy, effectively the posterior uncertainty
modeled simply by the Shannon entropy, normalized with
respect to its prior correspondence. Under this perspective,
mutual information might also be connected to the branch of
the tree in Fig. 4 leading to Shannon’s entropy.
3) δ-Disclosure and Differential Privacy: Finally, we
quickly remark on the connection of δ-disclosure and -
differential privacy with our theoretical framework. δ-disclo-
sure [13] is an even stricter privacy criterion than t-closeness,
and hence much stricter than that average privacy risk R or
mutual information, discussed in the previous subsection. The
definition of δ-disclosure may be rewritten in terms of our
notation as
δ = max
x,y
∣∣∣∣log pX|Y (x|y)pX(x)
∣∣∣∣ ,
and understood as a worst-case privacy criterion. In fact,
R 6 t 6 δ.
We mentioned in the background section that [14] analyzes
the case of the randomized perturbation Y of a true answer X
to a query in a private information retrieval system, before
returning it to the user. Consider two databases d and d′
that differ only by one record, but are subject to a common
perturbation rule pY |X , and let pY and p′Y be the two
probability distributions of perturbed answers induced. After
a slight manipulation of the definition given in the work cited,
but faithfully to its spirit, we may say that a randomized
perturbation rule provides -differential privacy when
 = max
y,d,d′
log
pY (y)
p′Y (y)
.
Even though it is clear that this formulation does not quite
match the problem in terms of prior and posterior distri-
butions described thus far, this manipulation enables us to
still establish a loose relation with δ-disclosure, in the sense
that the latter privacy criterion is a slightly stricter measure
of discrepancy between PMFs, also based on a maximum
(absolute) log ratio. We note, however, that although there
is a formal similarity between the metrics, there are substan-
tial differences between them in terms of their assumptions,
objectives, models, and privacy guarantees.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
This section provides two simple albeit insightful examples
that illustrate the measurement of privacy as an attacker’s
estimation error. Specifically, we quantify the level of pri-
vacy provided, first, by a privacy-enhancing mechanism that
perturbs location information in the scenario of LBS, and
secondly, by an anonymous-communication protocol largely
based on Crowds [21].
A. Data Perturbation in Location-Based Services
Our first example contemplates a user who wishes to access
an LBS provider. For instance, this could be the case of a user
who wants to find the closest Italian restaurant to their current
location. For this purpose, the user would inevitably have
to submit their GPS coordinates to the (untrusted) provider.
To avoid revealing their exact location, however, the user
itself could perturb their location information by adding, for
example, Gaussian noise. Alternatively, we could consider a
user delegating this task to a (trusted) intermediary entity, as
described in Sec. V-A2. In any case, data perturbation would
enhance user privacy in terms of location, although clearly
at the cost of data utility. Simply put, perturbative privacy
methods present the inherent trade-off between data utility and
privacy.
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Fig. 8: A user looking for a nearby Italian restaurant accesses an LBS provider.
The user decides to perturb their actual location before querying the provider.
In doing so, the user hinders the provider itself and any attacker capable of
capturing their query, in their efforts to compromise user privacy in terms of
location. In this example, we contemplate that the user is solely responsible
for protecting their private data. In terms of our notation, this allows us to
regard the user as the system. Notice that the user’s actual location is, on
the one hand, the attacker’s unknown, and on the other, the information
that the user (system) takes as input to generate the location that will be
finally revealed. Thus we conclude that X = X′. Then, according to some
randomized perturbation rule pY ′|X′ , the user discloses, for each location
data x′, a perturbed version y′. This perturbed location is submitted to the
provider, which only has access to this information, i.e., Y = Y ′. Lastly,
based on this revealed information, the attacker uses a Bayes estimator xˆ(y)
to ascertain the user’s actual location X .
Under the former strategy, and in accordance with the
notation defined in Sec. IV-A, the user becomes the system—it
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is the user who is responsible for protecting their location data.
Playing the role of the system, the user decides then to perturb
their location data X on an individual basis for each query. In
other words, we do not contemplate the case of sequences of
data Xk, as Sec. V-A2 does.
A key element of our framework is the attacker’s distortion
function. In our example we assume the squared error between
the actual location x and the attacker’s estimate xˆ, that is,
dA(x, xˆ) = ‖x − xˆ‖2. Unlike Hamming distance, note that
the squared error does quantify how much the estimate differs
from the unknown. As for the other variables of our model, we
contemplate that the attacker’s input Y is directly the location
data perturbed by the user, Y ′, as illustrated in Fig. 8. Put
differently, the attacker, assumed to be the service provider,
has no more information than that disclosed by the user. Under
all these assumptions, the average privacy (4) is
Pavg = E[‖X − Xˆ‖2],
that is, the mean squared error (MSE).
As a final remark, we would like to connect our privacy
criterion with a metric specifically conceived for the LBS
scenario at hand [34]. In this cited work, the authors propose
a framework that contemplates different aspects of the adver-
sarial model, captured by means of what they call certainty,
accuracy and correctness. The information to be protected
by a trusted intermediary system are traces modeling the
locations visited by users over a period of time. The system
accomplishes this task by hiding certain locations, reducing
the accuracy of such locations or adding noise. As a result,
the attacker observes a perturbed version of the traces and,
together with certain mobility profiles of these users, attempts
to deduce some information of interest X about the actual
traces. In terms of our notation, the observed trajectories and
the mobility patterns constitute the attacker’s observation Y .
More accurately, given a particular observation y, the at-
tacker strives to calculate the posterior distribution pX|Y .
However, since the adversary may have a limited number
of resources, they may have to content themselves with an
estimate pˆX|Y . The authors then use Shannon’s entropy to
measure the uncertainty of X , and define accuracy as the
discrepancy between pX|Y and pˆX|Y . Finally, they refer to
location privacy as correctness and measure it as
EpˆX|Y [dS(X,xt)|y],
where xt is the true outcome of X , dS a distance function
specified by the system, and the expectation is taken over the
estimate of the posterior distribution.
The most notable difference between [34] and our own work
is that the authors limit the scope of their metric to the specific
scenario of location-based services; whereas here we attempt
to provide a general overview. Besides, their proposal is a
measure of privacy in an average-case sense. Another impor-
tant distinction between the cited work and ours is that the
former arrives to the conclusion that entropy and k-anonymity
are not appropriate metrics for quantifying privacy in the
context of LBS. Our work, however, does not argue against
the use of entropy, k-anonymity and any of the other privacy
metrics examined in Sec. V. In fact, we regard these metrics
as particular cases of the attacker’s estimation error under
certain assumptions on the adversarial model, the attacker’s
strategy and a number of different considerations explored
in that section. Lastly, their implementation of estimation
strategies using the forward-backward [40] and the Metropolis-
Hastings [41] algorithms are undoubtedly of great interest, but
the focus of the present work is on metrics.
B. Crowds-like Protocol for Anonymous Communications
In Sec. II-A we mentioned Chaum’s mixes as a building
block to implement anonymous communications networks.
A different approach to communication anonymity is based
on collaborative, peer-to-peer architectures. An example of
collaborative approach is Crowds [21], in which users form
a “crowd” to provide anonymity for each other.
In Crowds, a user who wants to browse a Web site forwards
the request to another member of his crowd chosen uniformly
at random. This crowd member decides with probability p to
send the request to the Web site, and with probability 1 − p
to send it to another randomly chosen crowd member, who
in turn repeats the process. For the purposes of illustration,
we consider a variation of the Crowds protocol. The main
difference with respect to the original Crowds is that we do not
introduce a mandatory initial forwarding step. We note that this
variation provides worse anonymity than the original protocol,
while also reducing the cost (in terms of delay and bandwidth)
with respect to Crowds. Further, we assume that the users
participating in the protocol are honest; i.e., we only consider
the Web site receiving the request as possible adversary.
More formally, consider n users indexed by i = 1, . . . , n,
wishing to communicate with an untrusted server. In order to
attain a certain degree of anonymity, each user submits the
message directly to said server with probability p ∈ (0, 1),
and forwards it to any of the other users, including themselves,
with probability 1−p. In the case of forwarding, the recipient
performs exactly the same probabilistic decision until the
message arrives at the server. Fig. 9 shows the operation of
this protocol.
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Fig. 9: Anonymous-communication protocol inspired by Crowds. In our
second numerical example, we contemplate a scenario where users send
messages to a common, untrusted server, who aims at compromising sender
anonymity. In response to this privacy threat, users decide to adhere to a
modification of the Crowds protocol, whose operation is as follows: each
user flips a biased coin and depending on the outcome chooses to submit the
message to the server or else to another user, who is asked to perform the
same process. The probability that a user forward the message to the server is
denoted by p, whereas the probability of sending it to any other peer, including
themselves, is (1− p)/n.
In our protocol, we assume that the server attempts to guess
the identity of the author of a given message, represented
by the r.v. X , knowing only the user who last forwarded
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it, represented by the r.v. Y , consistently with the notation
defined in Sec. IV-A. The other variables of our framework
are as follows. Since the set of users involved in the protocol
collaborate to frustrate the efforts of the server, they are in
fact the system. The information that then serves as input to
this system is simply the identity of the user who initiates
the forwarding protocol, X . That is, the attacker’s uncertainty
and the system’s input coincide, X ′ = X . Then again, the
assumption that the server just knows the last sender in the
forwarding chain leads to Y = Y ′.
Under this model, and under the assumption of a uniform
message-generation rate, that is, pX(x) = 1/n for all x, it can
be proven that the conditional PMF of X given Y = y is
pX|Y (x|y) =
{
p+ (1− p)/n , x = y
(1− p)/n , x 6= y . (10)
Fig. 10 shows this conditional probability in the particular
case when x = 1, i.e., the probability that the originator of a
message be user 1, conditioned to the observation that the last
sender is user y. Note that, because of the symmetry of our
model, it would be straightforward to derive a PMF analogous
to the one plotted in this figure, but for other originators of
the message, namely x = 2, . . . , n.
1     2      3     4     5     6      6   n 
y
PfX = 1jY = yg
…  
…  
n ¡ 1
p + (1 ¡ p)=n
(1 ¡ p)=n
Fig. 10: Probability that the original sender of a given message be the user
1, conditioned to the observation that the last sender in the forwarding path
is user y. From this figure, we observe the PMF attains its maximum value
when this last sender is precisely the user 1.
That said, assume that the attacker chooses Hamming
distance as distortion function. Under this assumption, the
conditional privacy (2) yields
P(y) = P{X 6= xˆ(y)|y},
that is, the MAP error conditioned on the observation y.
Because Hamming distance implies, by virtue of (1), that
Bayes estimation is equivalent to MAP estimation, it follows
that the attacker’s (best) decision rule is xˆ(y) = y. Leveraging
on this observation, we obtain that the privacy level provided
by this variant of Crowds is
P(y) = εMAP = 1− P{X = y|y} = (1− p)(1− 1/n),
from which it follows an entirely expected result—the lower
the probability p of forwarding a message directly to the
server, the higher the privacy provided by the protocol, but
the higher the delay in the delivery of said message.
In the following, we consider the measurement of the
privacy protection offered by this protocol, in terms of the
three Re´nyi’s entropies introduced in Sec. V-A, namely the
min-entropy H∞(X|y), the Shannon entropy H1(X|y) and
the Hartley entropy H0(X|y) of the r.v. X , modeling the
actual sender of a given message (the privacy attacker’s
target), given the observation of the user who last forwarded
it, y. Specifically, we connect the interpretations described in
Sec. V-A to the example at hand.
But first we would like to recall from Sec. V-A1 that
H∞(X|y), H1(X|y) and H0(X|y) may be considered, from
the point of view of the user, as a worst-case, average-case and
best-case measurements of privacy, respectively, in the sense
that
H∞(X|y) 6 H1(X|y) 6 H0(X|y),
owing to (6), with equality if and only if the conditional PMF
of X given Y = y is uniform. Revisiting the interpretations
given in that section, recall that the min-entropy H∞(X|y) is
directly connected with the maximum probability, in our case
maxxi pX|Y (xi|y) = p+ (1− p)/n, on account of (10). More
concretely, and in the context of our example, min-entropy
reflects the model in which a privacy attacker makes a single
guess of the originator of a message, specifically the most
likely one, which corresponds to x = y.
At the other extreme, the Hartley entropy H0(X|y) is a pos-
sibilistic rather than probabilistic measure, as it corresponds
to the assumption that a privacy attacker would not content
themselves with discarding all but the most likely sender, but
consider instead all possible users. More accurately, measuring
privacy as a Hartley’s entropy essentially boils down to the
cardinality of the set of all possible originators of a message,
namely H0(X|y) = log n.
On a middle ground lies Shannon’s entropy, which was
interpreted in Sec. V-A2 by means of the AEP, specifically in
terms of the effective cardinality of the set of typical sequences
of i.i.d. samples of an r.v. Put in the context of our Crowds-like
protocol, however, Shannon’s entropy may be deemed as an
average-case metric that considers the entire PMF of X given
Y = y, and not merely its maximum value or its support set.
VII. GUIDE FOR DESIGNERS OF SDC AND ACSS
The purpose of this section is to show the applicability of
our framework to those designers of SDC and ACSs who,
wishing to quantify the level of protection offered by their
systems, do not want to delve into the mathematical details
set forth in Sec. V. In order to assist such designers in the
selection of the privacy metric most appropriate for their
requirements, this section revises the application scenarios of
SDC and anonymous communications, and classifies some of
the metrics used in these fields in terms of worst case, average
case and best case, from the perspective of the user.
Before proceeding with the cases of SDC and ACSs, we
would like to elaborate on the distinction between Hamming
and non-Hamming distortion functions, between whether these
functions are known or unknown to the system, and finally
between single and multiple-occurrence data. The reason is
that the understanding of these concepts is fundamental for
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a system designer who, following the arguments sketched in
Fig. 4, wants to choose the suitable metrics for their field
of application. With this purpose, next we illustrate these
concepts by means of a couple of simple albeit insightful
examples.
The first consideration a system designer should take into
account when applying our framework refers to the geometry
of the attacker’s distortion function dA, namely whether it is
a Hamming or a non-Hamming function. To illustrate this
key point, consider a set of users in a social network. A
Hamming function taking as inputs the users u1 and u2 would
model an attacker who contemplates only their identities when
comparing them, and ignores any other information such as
the relationship between them within the social network, their
profile similarity or their common interests. On the contrary,
a more sophisticated adversary could represent said network
by a graph, modeling users and relationships among them as
nodes and edges, respectively. Leveraging on this graph, the
attacker could use a non-Hamming function to compute the
number of hops separating these two users and, accordingly,
lead to the conclusion that they are, for example, close friends
since dA(u1, u2) = 1.
The second consideration builds on the assumption of a non-
Hamming attacker’s distortion function. Under this premise,
we contemplate two possible cases—when the function is
known to the system and when not. The former case is illus-
trated, for instance, in the context of location-based services—
in this application scenario, an adversary will probably use
the Euclidean distance to measure how their estimated loca-
tion differs from the user’s actual location. The latter case,
i.e., when the measure of distortion used by the attacker is
unknown to the system, would undoubtedly model a more
general and realistic scenario. As an example of this case,
consider a system perturbing the queries that a user wants to
submit to a database, and an attacker wishing to ascertain the
actual queries of this user. Suppose that these queries are one-
word queries and that the perturbation mechanism replaces
them with synonyms or semantically-similar words. Under
these assumptions, our attacker could opt for a non-Hamming
distortion function and measure the distance between the
actual query and the estimate as the number of edges in a
given ontology graph. Although the system could be aware
of this fact, the specific ontology used by the attacker could
not be available to the system, and consequently the distortion
function would remain unknown.
Our last consideration is related to the nature of the variables
of our framework, summarized in Table I. Specifically, we con-
template two possible cases—single and multiple-occurrence
data. The former case considers such variables to be tuples
of a small number of components, and the latter assumes
that these variables are sequences of data. An LBS attacker
who observes the disclosed, possibly perturbed location of a
user and makes a single guess about their actual location is
an example of single-occurrence data. To illustrate the case
of multi-occurrence data, consider a set of users exchanging
messages through a mix system. Recall that such systems
delay and reorder messages with the aim of concealing who is
communicating with whom. Among the multiple attacks these
systems are vulnerable to, the statistical disclosure attack [42]
is a good example for our purposes of illustration, since
it assumes an adversary who observes a large number or
sequence of messages coming out of the mix, with the aim
of tracing back their originators.
Having examined these key aspects of our framework, now
we turn our attention, first, to the application scenario of
SDC, and secondly, to the case of ACSs. In the former
scenario, a data publisher aims at protecting the privacy of
the individuals appearing in a microdata set. Depending on
the privacy requirements, the publisher may want to prevent
an attacker from ascertaining the confidential attribute value of
any respondent in the released table. Under this requirement,
t-closeness and mutual information appear as acceptable mea-
sures of privacy, since both criteria protect against confidential
attribute disclosure. Recall that the assumptions on which they
are based are a prior belief about the value of the confidential
attribute in the table, and a posterior belief of said value given
by the observation that the user belongs to a particular group
of this table. Building on these premises, t-closeness may be
regarded as a worst-case measurement of privacy, in the sense
that it identifies the group of users whose distribution of the
confidential attribute deviates the most from the distribution
of this same attribute in the entire table. In this regard, we
would like to note that a worst-case metric from the point of
view of the user is a best-case measure from the standpoint
of the attacker, and vice versa.
Although t-closeness overcomes the similarity and skewness
attacks mentioned in Sec. II-B, its main limitation is that
no computational procedure to reach this criterion has been
specified. An alternative is the mutual information between
the confidential attributes and the observation, an average-
case version of t-closeness that leads to a looser measure of
privacy. In any of these two metrics, it is assumed the more
general case in which the attacker’s distortion function is not
the Hamming distance. Specifically, this assumption models
an adversary who does not content themselves with finding
out whether the estimate and the unknown match, but wishes
to quantify how much they diverge.
Another distinct privacy requirement is that of identity
disclosure, whereby a publisher wishes to protect the released
table against a linking attack. In this attack, the adversary’s
aim is to uncover the identity of the individuals in the released
table by linking the records in this table to a public data
set including identifier attributes. Under this requirement and
under the assumption that the attacker regards each respondent
within a particular group as equally likely, k-anonymity may
be deemed as a best-case measure of privacy, determined by
Hartley’s entropy. We refer to this criterion as a best-case
metric precisely due to the naive assumption of a uniform
distribution of the identifier attribute. In other words, the
underlying adversarial model does not contemplate that an
attacker may have background knowledge that allows them
to consider certain users as more likely than others. In the
end, we may also regard the l-diversity criterion as a best-
case metric, since it assumes a uniform distribution of the
confidential attribute on a set of at least l values. Put another
way, this rudimentary adversarial model does not contemplate,
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for example, the fact that certain values of the confidential
attribute may be semantically similar.
In the scenario of anonymous-communication systems, there
exists a wide variety of approaches. Among them, a popular
anonymous-communication protocol is Crowds. Although in
this section we limit the discussion of the privacy provided
by such systems to a variant of this protocol, we would like
to stress that the conclusions drawn here may be extended to
other anonymous systems. Having said this, recall that in the
original Crowds protocol, a system designer makes available
to users a collaborative protocol that helps them enhance
the anonymity of the messages sent to a common, untrusted
Web server. The design parameters are the number of users
participating in the protocol and the probability of forwarding
a message directly to the server.
In our variant of this protocol, however, we contemplate an
attacker who strives to guess the identity of the sender of a
given message, based on the knowledge of the last user in
the forwarding path. Under this adversarial model, we may
regard min-entropy, Shannon’s entropy or Hartley’s entropy
as particular cases of our measure of privacy, depending on
the specific strategy of the attacker. For example, under an
adversary who uses maximum a posteriori estimation and,
accordingly, opts for the last sender, min-entropy may be
interpreted as a worst-case privacy metric. Alternatively, we
may assume an attacker that considers the entire probability
distribution of possible senders, and not only the most likely
candidate. In this case, Shannon’s entropy may be deemed as
an average-case measure. Finally, under a rudimentary attacker
who takes into account just the number of potential originators
of the message, Hartley’s entropy may be regarded as a best-
case measurement of privacy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A wide variety of privacy metrics have been proposed in the
literature. Most of these metrics have been conceived for spe-
cific applications, adversarial models, and privacy threats, and
thus are difficult to generalize. Even for specific applications,
we often find that various privacy metrics are available. For
example, to measure the anonymity provided by anonymous-
communication networks, several flavors of entropy (Shannon,
Hartley, min-entropy) can be found in the literature, while
no guidelines exist that explain the relationship between the
different proposals, and provide an understanding of how to
interpret and put in context the results provided by each of
them.
In the scenario of SDC, numerous approaches attempt to
capture, to a greater or lesser degree, the private information
leaked as a result of the dissemination of microdata sets. In
this spirit, k-anonymity is possibly the best-known privacy
measure, mainly due to its mathematical tractability. However,
numerous extensions and enhancements were introduced later
with the aim of overcoming its limitations. While all these
metrics have provided further insight into our understanding
of privacy, the research community would benefit from a
framework embracing all those metrics and making it possible
to compare them, and to evaluate any privacy-protecting
mechanism by the same yardstick.
In this work, we propose a privacy measure intended to
tackle the above issues. Our approach starts with the definition
and modeling of the variables of a general framework. Then,
we proceed with a mathematical formulation of privacy, which
essentially emerges from BDT. Specifically, we define privacy
as the estimation error incurred by an attacker. We first propose
what we refer to as conditional privacy, meaning that our
measure is conditioned on an attacker’s particular observation.
Accordingly, we define the terms of average privacy and worst-
case privacy.
The formulation is then investigated theoretically. Namely,
we interpret a number of well-known privacy criteria as
particular cases of our more general metric. The arguments
behind these justifications are based on fundamental results
related to the fields of information theory, probability theory
and BDT. More accurately, we interpret our privacy criterion
as k-anonymity and l-diversity principles by connecting them
to Re´nyi’s entropy and the concept of confidence set. Under
certain assumptions, a conditional version of the AEP allows
us to interpret Shannon’s entropy as an arbitrarily high con-
fidence set. Then, the total variation distance and Pinsker’s
inequality justify t-closeness requirement and the criterion
proposed in [15] as particular instances of our measure of
privacy. In the course of this interpretation, we find that our
formulation bears a strong resemblance with the rate-distortion
problem in information theory.
Our survey of privacy metrics, our detailed analysis of their
connection with information theory, and our mathematical
unification as an attacker’s estimation error, shed new light on
the understanding of those metrics and their suitability when it
comes to applying them to specific scenarios. In regard to this
aspect, two sections are devoted to the classification of several
privacy metrics, showing the relationships with our proposal
and the correspondence with assumptions on the attacker’s
strategy. While the former section approaches this from a
theoretical perspective, the latter shows the applicability of
our framework to those designers of SDC and ACSs who do
not wish to delve into the mathematical details. It is also our
goal to illustrate the riveting interplay between the field of
information privacy on the one hand, and on the other the
fields of information theory and stochastic estimation, while
bridging the gap between the respective communities.
A couple of simple albeit insightful examples are also
presented. Our first example quantifies the level of privacy
provided by a privacy-enhancing mechanism that perturbs
location information in the scenario of LBS. Under certain
assumptions on the adversarial model, our measure of privacy
becomes the mean squared error. Then we turn our attention
to the scenario of anonymous-communication systems and
measure the degree of anonymity achieved by a modification
of the collaborative protocol Crowds. We contemplate different
strategies for the attacker and, accordingly, interpret min-
entropy, Shannon’s entropy and Hartley’s entropy as worst-
case, average-case and best-case privacy metrics.
In closing, we hope that this unified perspective of privacy
metrics, drawing upon the principles of information theory
and Bayesian estimation, is a helpful, illustrative step towards
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the systematic modeling of privacy-preserving information
systems.
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Worst case Average case Best case 
Statistical 
disclosure control  
t-closeness mutual information 
k-anonymity 
l-diversity 
Anonymous-
communication 
systems 
min-entropy Shannon’s entropy Hartley’s entropy 
TABLE IV: Guide for designers of SDC and ACSs. This table classifies
several privacy metrics depending, first, on whether they are regarded as worst-
case, average-case and best-case measures, and secondly on their application
domain.
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